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Abstract
This study introduces automation into a Schumpeterian model to explore the dif-
ferent e¤ects of R&D and automation subsidies. R&D subsidy increases innovation
and decreases the share of automated industries with an overall inverted-U e¤ect on
economic growth. Automation subsidy decreases innovation and increases the share of
automated industries also with an inverted-U e¤ect on growth. Calibrating the model
to US data, we nd that the current level of R&D (automation) subsidy is above
(below) the growth-maximizing level. Simulating transition dynamics, we nd that
changing R&D (automation) subsidy to its growth-maximizing level causes a welfare
gain of 3.8% increase in consumption.
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1 Introduction
Automation allows machines to perform tasks that are previously performed by workers. On
the one hand, automation may be a threat to the employment of workers. For example, a
recent study by Frey and Osborne (2017) examines 702 occupations and nds that almost half
of them could be automated within the next two decades. On the other hand, automation
reduces the cost of production and frees up resources for more productive activities. Given
the rising importance of automation,1 we develop a growth model with automation to explore
its e¤ects on the macroeconomy.
Specically, we introduce automation in the form of capital-labor substitution into a
Schumpeterian growth model. Then, we apply the model to explore the e¤ects of R&D
subsidy versus automation subsidy on innovation, economic growth and social welfare. In
our model, an industry uses labor as the factor input before automation occurs. When the
industry becomes automated, it then uses capital as the factor input. Innovation in the form
of a quality improvement can arrive at an automated or unautomated industry. When an
innovation arrives at an automated industry, the industry becomes unautomated and once
again uses labor as the factor input.2 Therefore, the share of automated industries, which
is also the degree of capital intensity in the aggregate production function, is endogenously
determined by automation and innovation.
In this growth-theoretic framework, we obtain the following results. An increase in R&D
subsidy leads to a higher level of innovation as well as a higher rate of technological progress,
which gives rise to a conventional positive e¤ect of R&D subsidy on the growth rate of output.
However, the increase in skilled labor for innovation crowds out skilled labor for automation
and leads to a lower share of automated industries as well as a lower degree of capital
intensity in the aggregate production function, which in turn causes a negative growth e¤ect
that is absent in previous studies with exogenous capital intensity in production. Therefore,
an increase in R&D subsidy has an overall inverted-U e¤ect on the growth rate of output
due to endogenous capital intensity in production. Capital intensity a¤ects growth because
it determines the returns to scale of capital, which is a reproducible factor that can be
accumulated.
An increase in automation subsidy has a negative e¤ect on innovation and a positive
e¤ect on the share of automated industries but also an inverted-U e¤ect on output growth.
Calibrating the model to aggregate US data, we nd that the current level of R&D subsidy is
above the growth-maximizing level whereas the current level of automation subsidy is below
the growth-maximizing level. Furthermore, decreasing R&D subsidy improves social welfare
whereas increasing automation subsidy improves welfare. Simulating transition dynamics
of the economy, we nd that reducing the R&D subsidy rate (or raising the automation
subsidy rate) to its growth-maximizing level would lead to a welfare gain that is equivalent
to a permanent increase in consumption of 3.8%.
This study relates to the literature on innovation and economic growth. Romer (1990)
develops the seminal R&D-based growth model in which innovation is driven by the inven-
1See for example Agrawal et al. (2018) for a comprehensive discussion on articial intelligence, which is
the latest form of automation.
2See Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) for empirical evidence that "humans have a comparative advantage
in new and more complex tasks."
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tion of new products. Then, Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and
Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop the Schumpeterian quality-ladder model in which inno-
vation is driven by the development of higher-quality products. Many subsequent studies in
this literature use variants of the R&D-based growth model to explore the e¤ects of R&D
subsidies; see for example, Peretto (1998), Segerstrom (2000), Zeng and Zhang (2007), Im-
pullitti (2010), Chu et al. (2016) and Chu and Cozzi (2018). These studies do not feature
automation and hence tend to nd a positive e¤ect of R&D subsidies on innovation and
growth. An exception is Segerstrom (2000), who nds a positive (negative) e¤ect of R&D
subsidy if it is applied to quality improvement (variety expansion). In his model, growth
is driven by quality improvement, and there is a crowding-out e¤ect between quality im-
provement and variety expansion. Our study nds a crowding-out e¤ect between innovation
and automation, which gives rise to an inverted-U growth e¤ect of R&D subsidies because
innovation and automation are both important to economic growth.
This study also relates to the literature on automation and innovation; see Aghion et
al. (2017) for a comprehensive discussion of this literature. An early study by Zeira (1998)
develops a growth model with capital-labor substitution, which forms the basis of automation
in subsequent studies. Zeira (2006) contributes to the literature by introducing endogenous
invention of technologies into Zeira (1998). Peretto and Seater (2013) propose a growth model
with factor-eliminating technical change in which R&D serves to increase capital intensity
in the production process. Our study relates to Peretto and Seater (2013) by considering
both factor-eliminating technical change (i.e., automation) and factor-augmenting technical
change (i.e., innovation) and exploring their relative importance on growth and welfare.
Recent studies by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) and Hemous and Olson (2018) generalize
the model in Zeira (1998) and introduce directed technological change between automation
and variety expansion in order to explore the e¤ects of automation on the labor market
and income inequality.3 Our study complements these interesting studies by embedding
endogenous automation into the Schumpeterian quality-ladder model4 and performing a
comparative policy analysis to explore the di¤erent e¤ects of R&D and automation subsidies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
compares the e¤ects of the two subsidies. The nal section concludes.
2 A Schumpeterian growth model with automation
We introduce automation in the form of capital-labor substitution as in Zeira (1998) into
a canonical Schumpeterian growth model. We consider a cycle of automation and innova-
tion. An unautomated industry that currently uses labor as the factor input can become
automated and then use capital as the factor input. Innovation in the form of a quality
improvement can arrive at an automated or unautomated industry. When an innovation
arrives at an automated industry, the industry becomes unautomated and once again uses
labor as the factor input until the next automation arrives.5 This cycle repeats indenitely.
3See also Prettner and Strulik (2017) for a variety-expanding model with automation and education.
4See also Aghion et al. (2017) who develop a Schumpeterian model with exogenous automation.
5Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) make a similar assumption that all new inventions are rst produced by
labor until they are automated.
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2.1 Household
The representative household has the following utility function:
U =
Z 1
0
e t ln ctdt, (1)
where the parameter  > 0 is the subjective discount rate and ct is the level of consumption.
The household supplies l units of low-skill labor and one unit of high-skill labor to earn
wages and makes consumption-saving decision to maximize utility subject to the following
asset-accumulation equation:
_at + _kt = rtat + (Rt   )kt + wl;tl + wh;t    t   ct. (2)
at is the real value of assets (i.e., the share of monopolistic rms), and rt is the real interest
rate. kt is physical capital, and Rt   is the real rental price net of capital depreciation. wl;t
and wh;t are respectively the real wage rates of low-skill labor and high-skill labor.  t is a
lump-sum tax (or transfer). From standard dynamic optimization, the Euler equation is
_ct
ct
= rt   . (3)
Also, the no-arbitrage condition rt = Rt    holds.
2.2 Final good
Competitive rms produce nal good yt using the following Cobb-Douglas aggregator over
a unit continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods:
yt = exp
Z 1
0
lnxt(i)di

, (4)
where xt(i) denotes intermediate good i 2 [0; 1].6 The conditional demand function for xt(i)
is given by
xt(i) =
yt
pt(i)
, (5)
where pt(i) is the price of xt(i).
2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries, which are also indexed by i 2 [0; 1], producing
di¤erentiated intermediate goods. If an industry is not automated, then the production
process uses labor and the production function is
xt(i) = z
nt(i)lt(i), (6)
6We follow Zeira (1998) to interpret xt(i) as intermediate goods. Alternatively, one could follow Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2018) to interpret xt(i) as tasks.
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where the parameter z > 1 is the step size of each quality improvement, nt(i) is the number
of quality improvements that have occurred in industry i as of time t, and lt(i) is the amount
of low-skill labor employed in industry i. Given the productivity level znt(i), the marginal
cost function of the leader in an unautomated industry i is wl;t=znt(i). The monopolistic price
is a constant markup over the marginal cost such that
pt(i) = 
wl;t
znt(i)
, (7)
where the markup  > 1 is a policy parameter determined by the government.7 Therefore,
the wage payment in an unautomated industry is
wl;tlt(i) =
1

pt(i)xt(i) =
1

yt, (8)
and the amount of monopolistic prot in an unautomated industry is
lt(i) = pt(i)xt(i)  wl;tlt(i) =
  1

yt. (9)
If an industry is automated, then we follow Zeira (1998) to assume that the production
process uses capital and the production function is
xt(i) = z
nt(i)kt(i). (10)
Given the productivity level znt(i), the marginal cost function of the leader in an automated
industry i is Rt=znt(i).8 The monopolistic price is also a constant markup over the marginal
cost such that
pt(i) = 
Rt
znt(i)
. (11)
The capital rental payment in an automated industry is
Rtkt(i) =
1

pt(i)xt(i) =
1

yt, (12)
and the amount of monopolistic prot in an automated industry is
kt (i) = pt(i)xt(i) Rtkt(i) =
  1

yt. (13)
7Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) assume that the markup is equal to the
quality step size z, due to limit pricing between current and previous quality leaders. Here we follow Howitt
(1999) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) to consider an alternative scenario in which new quality leaders
do not engage in limit pricing with previous quality leaders because after the implementation of the newest
innovations, previous quality leaders exit the market and need to pay a cost before reentering. Given the
Cobb-Douglas aggregator in (4), the unconstrained monopolistic price would be innite. We follow Evans
et al. (2003) to consider price regulation under which the regulated markup ratio cannot be greater than
 > 1. This additional markup parameter enables us to perform a more realistic quantitative analysis.
8The marginal cost of production using capital is Rt=znt(i) whereas the marginal cost of production using
labor is wl;t=znt(i). Given that Rt remains constant and wl;t grows on the balanced growth path, wl;t > Rt
will eventually hold.
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2.4 R&D and automation
Equations (9) and (13) show that lt(i) = 
l
t and 
k
t (i) = 
k
t for each type of industries.
Therefore, the value of inventions is also the same within each type of industries such that
vlt(i) = v
l
t and v
k
t (i) = v
k
t .
9 The no-arbitrage condition that determines the value vlt of an
unautomated invention is
rt =
lt + _v
l
t   (t + t)vlt
vlt
, (14)
which states that the rate of return on vlt is equal to the interest rate. The return on v
l
t is
the sum of monopolistic prot lt, capital gain _v
l
t and expected capital loss (t+t)v
l
t, where
t is the arrival rate of automation and t is the arrival rate of innovation.10 Similarly, the
no-arbitrage condition that determines the value vkt of an automation is
rt =
kt + _v
k
t   tvkt
vkt
, (15)
which states that the rate of return on vkt is also equal to the interest rate. The return on
vkt is the sum of monopolistic prot 
k
t , capital gain _v
k
t and expected capital loss tv
k
t , where
t is the arrival rate of innovation.11
Competitive entrepreneurs recruit high-skill labor to perform innovation. The arrival
rate of innovation in industry i is given by
t(i) = 'thr;t(i), (16)
where 't  'h 1r;t . The aggregate arrival rate of innovation is t = 'hr;t, where hr;t denotes
aggregate R&D labor. Here the parameter  2 (0; 1) captures an intratemporal duplication
externality as in Jones and Williams (2000) and determines the degree of decreasing returns
to scale in R&D at the aggregate level. In a symmetric equilibrium, the free-entry condition
of R&D becomes
tv
l
t = (1  s)wh;thr;t , 'vlt = (1  s)wh;th1 r;t , (17)
where s < 1 is the R&D subsidy rate.12
There are also competitive entrepreneurs who recruit high-skill labor to perform automa-
tion. The arrival rate of automation in industry i is given by
t(i) = tha;t(i), (18)
where t  (1   t)h 1a;t . The endogenous variable t 2 (0; 1) is the fraction of industries
that are automated at time t. In other words, 1   t captures the following e¤ect: a larger
9We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium. See Cozzi et
al. (2007) for a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique rational-expectation
equilibrium in the Schumpeterian model.
10When the next innovation occurs, the previous technology becomes obsolete. This is known as the Arrow
replacement e¤ect; see Cozzi (2007) for a discussion.
11Here we assume the Arrow replacement e¤ect applies such that the previous automation becomes obsolete
when the next innovation arrives. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) also make a similar assumption that when
a new unautomated variety arrives, a previous automated variety becomes obsolete.
12If s < 0, then it acts as a tax on R&D.
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mass of currently unautomated industries that can be automated makes automation easier
to complete. The aggregate arrival rate of automation is t = ha;t, where ha;t denotes
aggregate automation labor and we have used the condition that ha;t(i) = ha;t=(1  t).13 In
a symmetric equilibrium, the free-entry condition of automation becomes
tv
k
t = (1  )wh;tha;t=(1  t), (1  t)vkt = (1  )wh;th1 a;t , (19)
where  < 1 is the automation subsidy rate.14
2.5 Government
The government collects tax revenue to nance the subsidies on R&D and automation. The
balanced-budget condition is
 t = swh;thr;t + wh;tha;t. (20)
2.6 Aggregate economy
Aggregate technology Zt is dened as15
Zt  exp
Z 1
0
nt(i)di ln z

= exp
Z t
0
!d! ln z

, (21)
where the last equality uses the law of large numbers. Di¤erentiating the log of Zt in (21)
with respect to time yields the growth rate of technology given by
gz;t 
_Zt
Zt
= t ln z. (22)
Substituting (6) and (10) into (4) yields
yt = exp
Z 1
0
nt(i)di ln z +
Z t
0
ln kt(i)di+
Z 1
t
ln lt(i)di

= Zt

kt
t
t  l
1  t
1 t
, (23)
where the share t of automated industries also determines the degree of capital intensity in
the aggregate production function. The evolution of t is determined by
_t = t(1  t)  tt, (24)
where t = ha;t and t = 'h

r;t are respectively the arrival rates of automation and innova-
tion. Using (2), one can derive the familiar law of motion for capital as follows:16
_kt = yt   ct   kt. (25)
13Recall that automation is only directed to currently unautomated industries, which have a mass of 1 t.
14If  < 0, then it acts as a tax on automation.
15Recall that automation does not improve quality but only allows for capital-labor substitution.
16Derivations are available upon request.
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From (8) and (12), the capital and labor shares of income are respectively
Rtkt =
t

yt, (26)
wl;tl =
1  t

yt. (27)
2.7 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fat; kt; ct; yt; xt(i); lt(i); kt(i); hr;t(i); ha;t(i)g and
prices frt; Rt; wl;t; wh;t; pt(i); vlt(i); vkt (i)g such that the followings hold in each instance:
 the household maximizes utility taking frt; Rt; wl;t; wh;tg as given;
 competitive nal-good rms produce fytg to maximize prot taking fpt(i)g as given;
 each monopolistic intermediate-good rm i produces fxt(i)g and chooses flt(i); kt(i); pt(i)g
to maximize prot taking fwl;t; Rtg as given;
 competitive entrepreneurs choose fhr;t(i); ha;t(i)g to maximize expected prot taking
fwh;t; vlt(i); vkt (i)g as given;
 the market-clearing condition for capital holds such that R t
0
kt(i)di = kt;
 the market-clearing condition for low-skill labor holds such that R 1
t
lt(i)di = l;
 the market-clearing condition for high-skill labor holds such that R 1
0
hr;t(i)di+
R 1
t
ha;t(i)di =
1;
 the market-clearing condition for nal good holds such that yt = ct + _kt + kt;
 the value of inventions is equal to the value of the households assets such that R t
0
vkt (i)di+R 1
t
vlt(i)di = at; and
 the government balances the scal budget.
3 Growth and welfare e¤ects of R&D and automation
From (9) and (13), the amount of monopolistic prots in both automated and unautomated
industries is
lt = 
k
t =
  1

yt. (28)
8
The balanced-growth values of an innovation and an automation are respectively
vlt =
lt
+  + 
=
lt
+ ha + 'h

r
, (29)
vkt =
kt
+ 
=
kt
+ 'hr
. (30)
Substituting (29) and (30) into the free-entry conditions in (17) and (19) yields
'(1  )h1 a
(1  )(1  s)h1 r
=
+ ha + 'h

r
+ 'hr
,
which can be reexpressed as
1  
1  s

'

+

1  hr
hr

=

hr
1  hr
1 
+

hr
1  hr
1 2

'+ =hr
. (31)
If we assume   1=2,17 then the right-hand side of (31) is increasing in hr, whereas the left-
hand side is always decreasing in hr. Therefore, there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium
value of R&D labor hr and automation labor ha. R&D labor hr(s; ) is increasing in R&D
subsidy s but decreasing in automation subsidy , whereas automation labor ha(s; ) is
increasing in automation subsidy  but decreasing in R&D subsidy s.
From (24), the steady-state share of automated industries is
(s; ) =

 + 
=
ha
ha + 'h

r
, (32)
which is increasing in automation subsidy  but decreasing in R&D subsidy s. The steady-
state equilibrium growth rate of technology is
gz(s; ) =  ln z = 'h

r ln z, (33)
which is increasing in R&D subsidy s but decreasing in automation subsidy .
Given that yt and kt grow at the same rate on the balanced growth path, the production
function in (23) implies that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate of output yt is
gy(s; ) =
gz
1   =
 ln z
1   = (h

a + 'h

r) ln z, (34)
where gy = gz=(1   ) is increasing in capital intensity  for a given gz because a larger 
increases the returns to scale of capital, which is a reproducible factor that can be accumu-
lated. In (34), gy(s; ) can be increasing or decreasing in automation subsidy  and R&D
subsidy s. Intuitively, although automation subsidy  decreases the technology growth rate
gz, it may increase the output growth rate gy by expanding the share of automated indus-
tries and increasing the degree of capital intensity in production. In contrast, although R&D
subsidy s increases the technology growth rate gz, it may decrease the output growth rate gy
17In the appendix, we derive a weaker parameter condition.
9
by reducing the share of automated industries and decreasing the degree of capital intensity
in production.
Di¤erentiating gy in (34) with respect to ha subject to ha + hr = 1 yields the growth-
maximizing level of automation as
ha =
1=(1 )
'1=(1 ) + 1=(1 )
2 (0; 1). (35)
Therefore, for a given R&D subsidy rate s, there exists an automation subsidy rate  < 1
that maximizes gy by equating the steady-state equilibrium ha to ha. Similarly, for a given
automation subsidy rate , there also exists an R&D subsidy rate s < 1 that maximizes gy.
Proposition 1 summarizes these results
Proposition 1 An increase in the R&D subsidy rate s has a positive e¤ect on the technology
growth rate gz, a negative e¤ect on the share  of automated industries and an inverted-U
e¤ect on the output growth rate gy. An increase in the automation subsidy rate  has a
negative e¤ect on the technology growth rate gz, a positive e¤ect on the share  of automated
industries and an inverted-U e¤ect on the output growth rate gy.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We now explore how automation a¤ects social welfare. The steady-state level of social
welfare U can be expressed as
U = ln c0 +
gc

= ln

1  (gy + )k
y

| {z }
=ln(c=y)
+  ln

k


+ (1  ) ln

l
1  

| {z }
=ln y0
+
gy

, (36)
where Z0 is normalized to unity. The steady-state capital-output ratio is given by
k
y
=

R
=

(r + )
=

(gy + + )
, (37)
where  is given by (32) and gy is given by (34). If we shut down the automation process by
setting ha and  to zero, then the welfare function simplies to U = ln l+ (' ln z)=, which
together with (36) shows the following welfare e¤ects of introducing automation. First, it
reduces the consumption-output ratio by requiring the household to devote some output
to invest in physical capital. Second, the presence of physical capital contributes to the
production of output. Third, a lower labor intensity reduces the contribution of labor to the
production of output. Finally, introducing automation initially increases the growth rate of
output because the growth-maximizing level of automation ha in (35) is positive.
To explore the relative magnitude of these di¤erent e¤ects, we rst use the aggregate
production function in (23) to derive the balanced-growth level of capital as
k =
l
1  

k
y
Z
1=(1 )
, (38)
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where the steady-state capital-output ratio is given by (37). Normalizing Z0 in (38) to unity
and substituting (38) into (36) yield
U = ln

1  (gy + )k
y

+

1   ln

k
y

+ ln

l
1  

+
gy

. (39)
Equation (39) implies that the optimal allocation is fhr ; ha g ! f0; 1g, in which case our
growth model approaches an AKmodel in which economic growth can be sustained by capital
accumulation without technological progress. As fhr; hag approaches f0; 1g, the growth rate
of output becomes gy !  ln z, whereas the share of automated industries becomes  ! 1.
In this case, the capital-output ratio in (37) becomes k=y ! 1=[( ln z +  + )], which in
turn implies that the consumption-output ratio is positive even as  ! 1. To see this,
c
y
= 1  (gy + )k
y
! + (  1)( ln z + )
( ln z + + )
> 0,
where  > 0 and  > 1. Then, as the share of automated industries approaches unity, the
returns to scale of capital in production approaches constant, which amplies the e¤ect of
investment on the accumulation of capital and the level of output. This e¤ect is captured by

1  ln

k
y

+ln
 
l
1 

in (39), which approaches innity as  ! 1. Therefore, setting automa-
tion subsidy  ! 1 to devote all research resources to approach a fully automated production
process is socially optimal. This nding suggests that the case with only factor-eliminating
technical change analyzed in Peretto and Seater (2013) is not a restrictive limitation.
3.1 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to aggregate US data in order to perform a quantitative
analysis on the growth and welfare e¤ects of the two subsidies. The model features the
following set of parameters f; ; ; z; '; ; ; s; g.18 We choose a conventional value of 0.05
for the discount rate . As for the capital depreciation rate , we calibrate its value using an
investment-capital ratio of 0.0765 in the US. We use the estimate in Laitner and Stolyarov
(2004) to consider a value of 1.10 for the markup ratio . We calibrate the quality-step
size z using a long-run technology growth rate of 0.0125 in the US. We calibrate the R&D
productivity parameter ' using an innovation arrival rate of one-third as in Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2012). We calibrate the automation productivity parameter  using a labor-income
share of 0.60 in the US. As for the intratemporal externality parameter , we follow Jones and
Williams (2000) to set  to 0.5. Given that the US currently does not apply di¤erent rates
of subsidies to innovation and automation, we consider a natural benchmark of symmetric
subsidies s = .19 Then, we follow Impullitti (2010) to set the rate of subsidies in the US to
0.188. Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameter values.
18Our calibration does not require us to assign a value to low-skill production labor l. Although the welfare
function in (39) features low-skill production labor l, it only a¤ects the level of social welfare but not the
change in welfare.
19In our simulation, we will change the individual values of s and  separately.
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Table 1: Calibration
   z '   s 
0.050 0.058 1.100 1.039 0.403 0.296 0.500 0.188 0.188
In the rest of this section, we simulate the separate e¤ects of R&D subsidy s and au-
tomation subsidy  on the technology growth rate gz, the share  of automated industries,
the output growth rate gy and the steady-state level of social welfare U .20 Figure 1 simulates
the e¤ects of R&D subsidy s. Figure 1a shows that R&D subsidy s has a positive e¤ect on
the technology growth rate. Figure 1b shows that R&D subsidy s has a negative e¤ect on
the share of automated industries. Figure 1c shows that R&D subsidy s has an inverted-U
e¤ect on the growth rate of output. Starting from the current level of s = 0:188, any further
increase in the rate of R&D subsidy reduces economic growth, and the growth-maximizing
R&D subsidy rate is s = 0:148. Figure 1d shows that decreasing R&D subsidy improves
social welfare; for example, reducing the R&D subsidy rate from the current level of 0.188
to the growth-maximizing level of s = 0:148 would lead to a steady-state welfare gain that
is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of about 5.8%.
Figure 1a: E¤ect s on gz Figure 1b: E¤ect s on 
Figure 1c: E¤ect s on gy Figure 1d: E¤ect s on U
20We focus on the steady state in this section and consider transition dynamics in the next section.
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Figure 2 simulates the e¤ects of automation subsidy . Figure 2a shows that automa-
tion subsidy  has a negative e¤ect on the technology growth rate. Figure 2b shows that
automation subsidy  has a positive e¤ect on the share of automated industries. Figure
2c shows that automation subsidy  has an inverted-U e¤ect on the growth rate of output.
Starting from the current level of  = 0:188, a marginal increase in the rate of automation
subsidy stimulates economic growth, and the growth-maximizing automation subsidy rate
is  = 0:226. Figure 2d shows that increasing automation subsidy improves social welfare.
For example, raising the automation subsidy rate from the current level of 0.188 to the
growth-maximizing level of  = 0:226 would also lead to a steady-state welfare gain that is
equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of about 5.8%.
Figure 2a: E¤ect of  on gz Figure 2b: E¤ect of  on 
Figure 2c: E¤ect of  on gy Figure 2d: E¤ect of  on U
3.2 Transition dynamics
We use the relaxation algorithm in Trimborn et al. (2008) to simulate the transitional
dynamic e¤ects of reducing R&D subsidy s to the growth-maximizing level of s = 0:148.21
21The e¤ects of raising automation subsidy  to its growth-maximizing level  = 0:226 are the same.
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Figure 3a shows that a decrease in R&D subsidy leads to a lower technology growth rate
gz;t. The initial drop in gz;t is larger than the decrease in the long run. As shown in Figure
3b, capital intensity t increases towards a higher level that requires a large amount of
automation labor ha;t, which crowds out R&D labor hr;t. Figure 3c shows that despite the
fall in technology growth gz;t, the output growth rate gy;t increases initially before gradually
falling towards the new steady state, which is above the initial steady state. The drastic
initial increase in output growth gy;t is due to the high initial growth in capital intensity
t. Figure 3d shows that the (log) level of consumption decreases initially because the
increase in capital intensity leads to a higher level of capital investment, which crowds out
consumption. Then, the high output growth gy;t leads to a high consumption growth gc;t.
Gradually, consumption converges to a new balanced growth path (BGP), which has a higher
growth rate than the initial BGP. Comparing the new transitional path of consumption and
its initial BGP, we compute a welfare gain equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption
of 3.8%. Finally, Figure 4a shows that the transitional welfare e¤ects of R&D subsidy s are
about two-thirds of the steady-state welfare e¤ects of s in Figure 1d, whereas Figure 4b
shows that the transitional welfare e¤ects of automation subsidy  are also about two-thirds
of the steady-state welfare e¤ects of  in Figure 2d.
Figure 3a: Dynamic e¤ect of a lower s on gz Figure 3b: Dynamic e¤ect of a lower s on 
Figure 3c: Dynamic e¤ect of a lower s on gy Figure 3d: Dynamic e¤ect of a lower s on c
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Figure 4a: E¤ect of s on U Figure 4b: E¤ect of  on U
4 Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a Schumpeterian growth model with automation. Our
model features innovation in the form of quality improvement and also automation in the
form of capital-labor substitution. Innovation gives rise to technological progress whereas
automation increases the returns to scale of capital in production. Therefore, innovation
and automation both a¤ect economic growth measured by the growth rate of output. R&D
subsidy increases innovation but crowds out automation, whereas automation subsidy in-
creases automation but crowds out innovation. As a result, each of the two subsidies has an
inverted-U e¤ect on economic growth. In contrast, the welfare e¤ects of the two subsidies are
monotonic. Specically, increasing R&D subsidy reduces welfare despite its positive e¤ect
on technological progress whereas increasing automation subsidy improves welfare despite
its negative e¤ect on the growth rate of technologies. Therefore, one cannot infer the welfare
implication of a policy change from its e¤ect on technologies alone. Finally, we have also
found that devoting resources to approach a fully automated production process is optimal.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. We rst establish the following su¢ cient parameter condition
for the uniqueness of the equilibrium:
 <
+ 
2+ 
2 (1=2; 1). (A1)
The left-hand side (LHS) of (31) is decreasing in hr, whereas the derivative of the right-hand
side (RHS) of (31) is given by
d
dhr
RHS =
1
(1  hr)2

1  hr
hr
 "
 (1  hr)1+
('hr + )
2 + (1  )  (2  1)
 (1  hr)
'hr + 
#
| {z }

. (A2)
Equation (A2) shows that when  < 1=2, RHS of (31) is monotonically increasing in hr. As
for  > 1=2, we consider the following lower bound of :
 > (1  )  (2  1)  (1  hr)

'hr + 
> (1  )   (2  1)

. (A3)
Equation (A3) shows that  < (+ ) = (2+ ) in (A1) is a su¢ cient condition for  > 0;
in this case, RHS of (31) is monotonically increasing in hr. Therefore, we have established
that the equilibrium hr is uniquely determined by (31) as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Equilibrium uniqueness
LHS of (31) being increasing in s (decreasing in ) implies that hr is monotonically increasing
from 0 to 1 as s < 1 increases on its domain (decreasing from 1 to 0 as  < 1 increases on its
domain).22 For the e¤ects of fs; g on f; gzg, we use (32) and (33). As for the inverted-U
e¤ects of fs; g on gy, we use (34) and (35) to establish that gy is an inverted-U function of
hr reaching a maximum at some interior point hr 2 (0; 1), which in turn implies that gy is
also an inverted-U function of s and .
22Recall that s and  can be negative, in which case they act as taxes.
18
Appendix B (not for publication)
This appendix describes the dynamics of the economy. Using (23) and (26), we obtain
rt = Rt    = tyt
kt
   = Zt


t
1  t
l
kt
1 t
  . (B1)
Substituting (B1) into (3) yields the growth rate of consumption as
_ct
ct
=
Zt


t
1  t
l
kt
1 t
     . (B2)
Using (9), (13), (23), (B1), t = 'hr;t and t = h

a;t, we reexpress (14) and (15) as
_vlt
vlt
=
Zt


t
1  t
l
kt
1 t
   + ha;t + 'hr;t  
(  1)=
(t)t (1  t)1 t
h
kt=(lZ
1=(1 t)
t )
it
vlt=(lZ
1=(1 t)
t )
, (B3)
_vkt
vkt
=
Zt


t
1  t
l
kt
1 t
   + 'hr;t  
(  1)=
(t)t (1  t)1 t
h
kt=(lZ
1=(1 t)
t )
it
vkt =(lZ
1=(1 t)
t )
. (B4)
From (23) and (25), we derive the growth rate of capital kt as
_kt
kt
=
Zt
(t)t (1  t)1 t

l
kt
1 t
  ct
kt
  . (B5)
The dynamics of t and Zt are given by
_t =
 
ha;t

(1  t) 
 
'hr;t

t, (B6)
_Zt
Zt
= 'hr;t ln z. (B7)
Di¤erential equations in (B2)-(B7) describe the autonomous dynamics of fct; vlt; vkt ; kt; t; Ztg
along with the following two static conditions:
hr;t =

'(1  )vlt
1=(1 )
 (1  s) (1  t) vkt
1=(1 )
+

'(1  )vlt
1=(1 ) , (B8a)
ha;t =

 (1  s) (1  t) vkt
1=(1 )
 (1  s) (1  t) vkt
1=(1 )
+

'(1  )vlt
1=(1 ) , (B8b)
which are obtained by eliminating wh;t from (17) and (19) to derive
hr;t
ha;t
=

' (1  )
 (1  s) (1  t)
vlt
vkt
1=(1 )
(B9)
and by substituting (B9) into ha;t+hr;t = 1. Finally, one can divide fct; vlt; vkt ; ktg by lZ1=(1 t)t
to dene stationarized variables and also eliminate l from the dynamic system.
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